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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SETH H. YOUNG, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
RICHARD SAUNDERS, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11868 
This is an action by the plaintiff-respondent to ob-
tain possession of a boat owned by him which was wrong-
fully taken and retained by the defendant-appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court found 'the plaintiff-respondent 
was the owner of the boat and entitled to immediate 
possession thereof. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court upholding 
the decision of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts as outlined by the Appellant 
on pages 2 and 3 of his brief are misleading and in many 
places not supported by the evidence. The statement of 
facts as found by the trial judge pages 68, 69 and 70 of 
the tran.script are amply supported by the evidence and 
are essentially as follows : 
The Defendant-Appellant did undertake to bor-
row the sum of $1500.00 from First Security Bank, 
using the boat as security, (Tr. pp. 31 and 39.) The 
title of the boat was taken strictly as a security device 
(Tr. p. 39.) The Bill of Sale specifically sets out con-
sideration in the sum of $1500.00 not $2000.00 (R. 17.) 
Sam Arge and the motor club organizations were in 
difficult financial straits and were unable to borrow the 
money needed in their own names. 
No financing statement was filed by Mr. Saunders 
showing the boat as security on an obligation to Mr. 
Saunders on any of the motor club organizations, Mr. 
Sam Arge or his son Kenneth (R. 17.) The First Se-
curity Bank did file a financing statement with the Sec-
retary of State showing Richard Saunders as debtor 
with a boat pledged as security (R. 17.) Sam Arge was 
in fact the owner of the boat and cau.sed the same to be 
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conveyed to the Plaintiff-Respondent through the then 
registered owner, Kenneth Arge, on his behalf, (Tr. 
pp. 8, 9, 10, 22, 26, 39, 50, 62 and 63.) 
The boat was not a "gift" to Mr. Young but was 
rather part of the consideration in resolving a complicat-
ed loan and security arrangement between them (Tr. 
pp. 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16.) 
Mr. Young tried to protect himself against any 
difficulty by establishing that there were no problems in 
connection with the title of the boat by checking with 
the Secretary of State (Tr. p. 7), by specifically asking 
Mr. Sam Arge and Mr. Kenneth Arge if there were any 
liens against the boat (Tr. p. 21), and when Mr. Saun-
ders advised Mr. Young that a local marine repair shop 
may possibly be claiming a lien agains't the boat, Mr. 
Young specifically inquired of the defendant's own at-
torney who assured him there was no problem and that 
the repair bills did not constitute a lien against the boat 
(Tr. pp. 11 and 12.) 
Mr. Young was not aware that Mr. Saunders had, 
claimed or might claim any interest as to title, ownership 
or security in the boat either prior to his taking title 
to the boat or, subsequent thereto, prior to his conclus-
ion of the transactions with 1\-Ir. Arge and the motor 
clubs, nor thereafter until such time as the boat was re-
moved from his property the following spring (Tr. pp. 




THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
ITS RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS 
THE OWNER OF THE BOAT AND ENTITL-
ED TO IMMEDIATE POSSESSION THERE-
OF. 
Section 70A-9-301 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as 
amended commonly referred to as the 'Uniform Com-
mercial Code', specifically provides as follows: 
70A-9-301. Persons who take priority over un-
perfected security interests - "Lien creditor." 
- (I) Except as otherwise provided in subsec-
tion ( 2), an unperf ected security interest is sub-
ordinate to the rights of 
(a) persons entitled to priority under section 
70A-9-312; 
(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor 
without knowledge of the security inter-
est and before it is perfected; 
( c) In the case of goods, instruments, docu-
ments, and chattel paper, a person who 
is not a secured party and who is a trans-
feree in bulk or other buyer not in ordi-
nary course of business to the that 
he gives value and receives delivery of the 
collateral without knowledge of the secur-
ity interest and before it is perfected; 
In this particular case Mr. Saunders did not per-
fect his security interest in the boat. The fact that the 
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bank filed a financing statement Mr. Saunders 
as having borrowed money on the boat is irrelevant to 
this action since the bank is not a party to the action and 
is making no claim to any interest in the boat having 
been paid in full on its note (Tr. p. 37.) 
If the bank were a party, the financing statement 
filed by it against the name of Richard Saunders would 
place no one on notice upon a reveiw of the record un-
less that person knew in fact that Richard Saunders had 
obtained a security interest from Sam Arge or some 
other person or organization relating to him. If the 
Bank were making a claim the boat, justice 
would require that the Uniform Commercial Code be 
interpreted so as to protect an innocent buyer without 
knowledge against such hidden transactions. To hold 
otherwise would open the door to fraud and subterfuge 
through which any person desiring to borrow money 
could do so through a third party while retaining posses-
sion in himself and then proceed to deceive any subse-
quent party who would be unable to uncover the hidden 
transaction and so be stripped of the protection intend-
ed for him by the provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. 
The boat in the present case remained in the poss-
ession of Sam Arge and his family and the title of the 
boat given to Mr. Saunders was a security arrangement 
designed to veil him with a phantom title so as to induce 
the bank to make the loan to Mr. Saunders and nothing 
more. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
findings of the Trial Court will not be overturned or re-
ver.sed unless clearly contrary to the evidence and that 
the evidence on review must be viewed by the court in a 
light most favorable to the holding of the Trial Court. 
McCullum vs. Clothier, 241 P2d 468, 121 U. 311 
(1952); Buckley vs. Cox, 247 P2d 277, 122 U. 151 
(1952). 
In the present case the court's findings, as detailed 
on pages 68, 69 and 70 of the transcript, are supported 
by the evidence presented at trial. 
Every payment made on the financing of the boat 
with Continental Bank was paid by the corporation and 
charged directly against the draw of Mr. Sam Arge. 
This is testified to by plaintiff's witness Joseph Ander-
son on page 26 of the transcript and also by the defend-
ant's witness, Mr. Harry Stout (Tr. p. 50.) 
Mr. Arge did not differentiate between his prop-
erty and the property of the various corporate entities 
through which he dealt (Tr. pp. 29, 62 and 63.) 
If a Bill of Sale was given to one of the motor 
clubs, Mr. Stout testified on page 67 of the transcript 
that this was a transaction similar to that in which the 
title was transferred to Mr. Saunders to obtain a loan 
and was a security device only. Further the boat was 
always registered in the name of either Sam Arge or 
subsequently his son, Kenneth Arge, (Tr. pp. 8 and 9), 
and the taxes in 1967 while the boat was regis'tered in 
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the name of Kenneth Arge were paid by Kenneth Arge 
(Tr. p. 10.) 
There is ample evidence to support the court's find-
ing that the boat was tran/)ferred to Mr. Young as part 
of the consideration for satisfaction of an obligation due 
and owing to Mr. Young. In concluding the complicat-
ed security transaction Mr. Young gave up among 
other things the "Marion Davis bracelet" which he had 
held as security along with other items and which was 
itself worth more than all of the obligations owed to 
him by Mr. Arge and the corporate organizations (Tr. 
p. 7.) 
The isolated statement, taken out of context by ap-
pellant at page 3 of his brief, is obviously just that, a 
statement out of context, and does not alter the clear 
import of the express testimony as set forth in the tran-
script on pages 6, 7, 8, 15 and 16 and the court's find-
ing that the boat was part of the consideration in the 
involved transaction should not be disturbed. 
Mr. Young attempted to take advantage of the 
protection afforded a potential purchaser by the Uni-
form Commercial Code and was advi_sed by the Secre-
tary of State that there was no financing /)tatement 
filed on the boat. He specifically asked Mr. Arge and 
his son if there were any liens against the boat and was 
advised there were not (Tr. p. 21.) 
He had a particular conversation with Mr. Saun-
ders relative to the boat at which time Mr. Saunders 
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knew that he, Mr. Saunders, had a Bill of Sale to the 
boat which fact he did not divulge to Mr. Young (Tr. 
pp. 41 and 45.) 
The corporation owed Mr. Saunders on an out-
standing obligation and Mr. Saunders was aware of the 
pressures which Mr. Young could place upon the cor-
poration which was already in difficult financial cir-
cumstances. Thus he was in a position where it was 
advantageous to himself, as well as the corporation, in 
which he had other interests and of which he was either 
at the time or shortly thereafter president, to clear the 
corporation of its obligation to Mr. Young, an accom-
plishment which would be hampered if he divulged to 
Mr. Young the fact that he claimed a security interest 
in the boat which he knew Mr. Young was accepting 
as part of the consideration in the transaction. 
The evidence further supports the court's finding 
that Mr. Young did not in fact become aware of and 
did not know that Mr. Saunders had a security interest 
in the boat. The only point of warning made by Mr. 
Saunders was that certain parties who had made repairs 
on the boat may be searching for it under claim of lien. 
Mr. Young immediately stated he did not want to take 
on more problems and that he did not want the boat if it 
meant problems and was at the time specifically advis-
ed by the appellant's own attorney who entered the 
conversation at that point that there was no problem 
with regard to the bills as they did not constitute a lien 
against the boat (Tr. pp. 11 and 12.) 
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We are left in a position where Mr. Saunders who 
knew he had obligated himself to First Security Bank 
with the boat as security concealed this fact from Mr. 
Young and knowing Mr. Young was giving up his 
rights as against Sam Arge and the corporate struc-
tures in concluding the transactions in which he knew 
the boat was part of the consideration and having spe-
cifically failed to record his security interest permitted 
Mr. Young to 'take the boat without placing him on 
notice. In fact thereafter Mr. Saunders did not contact 
Mr. Young and advise him of a security interest in the 
boat but rather had the boat removed from Mr. Young's 
possession and then with full knowledge of the above 
facts Mr. Saunder!) no'tified everyone except Mr. Young 
that he had picked up the boat and did not notify him 
until a later date after Mr. Young had reported the 
boat as missing (Tr. p 47.) This was an obvious at-
tempt to evade the one party who he clearly understood 
'to be the owner of the boat. 
The court found on page 70 that Mr. Saunders 
knowing that the boat was actually in the posses-
sion of Mr. Young nevertheless removed it from 
Mr. Young's possession where it had been stored 
and transferred it to his own possession trusting 
in the general complication of the situation to 
protect his equity. 
This finding is well supported by the evidence. 
The fact that Sam Arge completed the transfer of 
the boat by directing his son the then registered owner 
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to make out the Bill of Sale is not important since he 
obviously had the right to deal with the boat as he saw 
fit. His son, Kenneth, recognized this right and upon 
instruction from his father, executed the Bill of Sale. 
Mr. Sam Arge has never contested the validity of the 
Bill of Sale nor raised any questions relating thereto. 
The registration of the boat in the boy's name was either 
an additional subterfuge to protect his father's assets, 
or there existed between father and son an arrangement, 
agreement or obligation by which the father could di-
rect disposition of the boat for his own interest. The 
exact details of such arrangements between father and 
son are immaterial. The fact of the matter is that Sam 
Arge told Mr. Young he could deliver the boat as part 
of the consideration and this he did. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings of the Trial Court are amply support-
ed by the evidence and the ruling of the Trial Court 
should be sustained. The Plaintiff is the owner of the 
boat and is entitled to immediate possession thereof. The 
Defendant who has been permitted to retain possession 
of the boat throughout this proceeding should be order-
ed to return it to the Plaintiff forthwith. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
E. Earl Greenwood, Jr., 
Jay A. Meservy. 
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